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ABSTRACT
At present, as the Internet of Thing (IoT) is increasingly widely used in
human life, how to protect IoT devices from Malware attack has become an
inevitable problem. This project is an analysis of two malwares and how they
impact the Internet of Thing (IoT), especially the smart cameras common in
people’s life and used in the enterprise. The analysis looks at the vulnerabilities
of smart cameras and how Mirai malware and Persirai malware take advantage
to these vulnerabilities to attack smart cameras within the network through the
simulation process. Through the simulation, although both malwares were
implemented using different methods, they all see smart cameras as bots that
lead to a similar impact. In this analysis, the simulation process was set up to find
ways to prevent smart cameras from being infected by malware. The scanning
part found the target, the report part saw how malware gained access to their
target and the control part examined how malware controls infected smart
cameras to launch an attack. This analysis also looks at Cyber Kill Chain
framework to examine how it could be when applied to the smart cameras and
malicious software attack. The Cyber Kill Chain framework was used to break
down the cyberattacks and aided in providing ways to prevent both malwares at
every step. The framework shows that the user plays a huge role in preventing
smart cameras from malware attack. The more knowledge and awareness users
have, the safer the environment for their smart cameras.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Project Motivation
At present, as networks have become an indivisible part of human beings’
lives, the Internet of Things (IoT) has become a new noun, generalizing all the
devices that install software or other techniques to send data, receive
instructions, or both through the Internet. Benefiting from cheap computer chips
and high-bandwidth telecommunications, there are ten billion devices that
interact with the Internet. IoT is not only things people use every day, such as
cars and smart furniture, but it is also used in industries such as the automotive
industry and transportation. Among all the IoT devices, smart cameras are used
the most in human life. Smart cameras can collect data via sensors and supply
user demand based on this collected data. The collected data can be used to
predict when the machine needs to be serviced or to improve the residence’s
efficiency and security.
With the increasing significance of IoT, the issues of security are
unignorable. Josh (2022) said, “IoT is a network of connected smart devices
supplying rich data, but it can also be a security nightmare” (p.1). We can always
hear that there is no 100% safe way for security, and neither does IoT. As one
cyber-attack, malware and ransomware, which are malicious software designed
to gain access to control or damage devices, have become critical issues.
1

According to Lance Whitney (2021), the survey from NordPass shows that only
33% of users changed the default password on their devices (paras. 2). Without
changing the default password can lead to serious problems, especially with
smart appliances. The NCC group and Global Cyber Alliance (GCA)
implemented an experiment to analyze how many attempts hackers try to hack
into the environment they create with many smart appliances. It turns out over
12,000 cyber-attacks happened within one week.
With IoT technology getting mature, increasingly smart home appliances
are in modern homes. The smart home is composed of several equipment with
various functions. The same characteristic and the goal of the smart home is that
they are all connected to IoT, and they are created to make human life more
convenient, more comfortable, and simpler. Smart homes enable users to control
remotely, all the devices could be accessed through the app or the factory
program. However, the more connected the house is, the higher opportunity the
hacker could interpose our life and cause the lost. People continuously suffer the
attack from hackers to invade their smart home IoTs to gain the information then
control their devices. The attack might not cause huge damage, but it still be a
problem for users to be concerned about. So far, over 42% of Americans are
using smart appliances but half of them have no methods to protect their devices
(Douglas Broom, 2021).
This project will investigate the security of smart cameras by comparing
two different kinds of malware. The word malware is the abbreviation of malicious
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software. Malware is software that can be used by an attacker to damage their
target devices. There are five types of malwares can compromise smart
cameras’ security which are Virus, Worms, Spyware, Ransomware and bots. In
recent years, Mirai malware is the most widely known, developed by Paras Jha
and Josiah White in 2016. At first, Mirai malware is created to attack their college
but end up being replicated and changed by other cyber-criminal because of
leaking the code to the Internet. Different than other malware, Mirai malware
targets on the smart home devices such as smart camera and the home router to
make these devices become remotely control bots so the hacker could launch
the distributed denial of service (DDoS) on the Linux operation system which is
the system the most IoT devices run.
Another malware that was discovered in 2017, this backdoor open source
is called Persirai malware. Persirai malware was able to attack more than 1000
Internet Protocol (IP) cameras based on various Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM). According to the latest research, Persirai has already
replaced Mirai as the most common malware attack. Trend Micro has found that
the amount of IP camera infected by Persirai is two times than Mirai. Like other
malware, Persirai uses Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) protocol to infect IP
camera and no matter how strong the password is, it can still inject the instruction
to control the device.
Both malwares mentioned above are used to attack the smart camera
which is used the most in smart homes. Thus, studying this attacking program is
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important to improve smart camera security so the customer’s living environment
will not be in danger and people will not worry about their privacy being leaked.
This project is tried to analyze these two malwares and supply the method based
on the vulnerabilities of smart cameras.

Problem Statement
When we passed by the street, we could figure out that many families
have installed smart cameras to check the activity in and around their houses.
People are gradually installing smart cameras rather than traditional Wi-Fi
cameras. However, the Porch study in 2019 shows that only 43% of the
interviewees owned smart cameras because people are concerned about their
security. People are not willing to sacrifice their privacy for installing devices that
are not 100% secure. After the emergence of VPN services and more
transparent privacy policies needed from technology companies, an increased
number of families are beginning to implement smart cameras in their home
(Jason Cohen, 2019, p.1). By 2021, the global smart home market size was USD
6.42 billion, and it is continuously rising. As more people are having smart
cameras now, the awareness about smart camera security in both individuals
and institutions is a lingering problem.
This project will attempt to answer the following questions:
•

What vulnerabilities might the smart camera have?
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•

How Mirai malware and Persirai malware take advantage to these
vulnerabilities and how can they be prevented?

Based on that awareness of existing problems about smart cameras and it
is growing significantly in the market. This culminating experience project is
organized as follows: Chapter 2 will describe a review of the literature to
contextualize my research in the existing inquiry of smart camera security.
Chapter 3 will provide methods to answer the project questions. Chapter 4 will
provide the analysis data on the simulation process defined within Chapter 3 then
figure out which are the ways to against Mirai and Persirai malware attack.
Based on the result analysis, Chapter 5 is composed of a summary of the
research and the limitations of this project. This project is not supplying the best
method to against both Mirai malware and Persirai malware but putting an effort
to figure out some ways to prevent smart cameras from infecting by both
malwares in each step.

5

CHAPTER TWO:
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

What Is Smart Camera?
The word smart camera dates back to 1975, when Belbachir first
published it. In 1976, a smart camera was defined as a camera that could
process its pictures before recording them (HRL Laboratories,1976). Unlike
traditional cameras which are mainly composed of an image sensor, and then
process images to make the decision through an external PC that will take place
too much, a smart camera is an individual image processing system that not only
records and collects data but also extracts specific information from the
application to make the ideal decisions that are used in the automated system by
integrating image sensor and CPU functions to the camera which enables the
smart camera to simple the vision system and process image without using
external PC. Besides, the smart camera requires less space by supporting a
localized pass/fail decision system, I/O part rejection and network management
system. Figure 1 shows the general parts of a smart camera.
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Figure 1. Parts in Smart Camera (Tech Briefs, 2014)

Attacks to the Smart Camera
Hackers usually take advantage of the weakest part of smart cameras
which is called vulnerability to exposure and leads to severe damage such as the
customer privacy might be explored through the internet. People may believe
they are picking up a bargain wireless camera that can bring a sense of security,
when in fact they could be unwittingly inviting hackers into their home or
workplace (Kate Bevan, 2020). Since smart cameras are connecting to Wi-Fi to
transfer and receive data, they are more likely to become a target, especially the
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smart cameras do not support SSL/TLS encryption. Hackers are able to hack into
the camera to access the video stream to monitor the victim’s home, change the
password or discover the victim’s exact location. Below are some common
attacks on smart cameras:
Man-In-The-Middle Attacks (MitM)
The MitM attack is when the attacker locates himself between the user and
the application to pretend that the communication is normal. The goal of this
attack is to obtain personal information so the attacker could achieve identification
theft or change the password. According to a study in 2019, smart cameras store
information such as MAC address and IP address to Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) table. The MitM attackers gain information by receiving the reply from ARP
tables and then forwarding it to themselves. Figure 2 is an example of a MitM
attack.

8

Figure 2. MitM Attack (Imperva, 2020)
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack
Like other IoT devices, smart cameras rely on the Internet to operate. The
high-speed and high-bandwidth connection required by smart cameras provide
the best environment to launch a DDoS attack. The DDoS attack is to infect the
devices through an HTTP flood attack and a SYN flood attack. The infected
devices will turn into botnets and then send the request to the target server until
the server overloads and denial the service. The attacker usually attacks smart
camera by Brute-force password cracking as a breach to explore other devices
connect to the same network to make these devices become the botnet.
Exploiting Password and Social Engineering
People usually use their birth date password or keep using a password
such as “admin” when they install the smart cameras. Without a strong
password, it will become the most vulnerable issue for smart cameras that
9

enable attackers to gain access then attack. Even if the user uses the system
from a famous company, their password could be still leaked by a careless
company employee who suffers from social engineering so the attacker can gain
access to the database to get their username and then guess the password.

Mirai Malware Review
The Mirai malware, a self-propagating worm, was developed by Paras Jha
and Josiah White, who are the founder of the DDoS mitigation service company,
in 2016. At first, the Mirai malware was created to provide the DDoS protection
for Minecraft servers. However, after the open-resource code was published on
the website, the code was advanced by cyber-criminal. According to the report by
OVH, the largest hosting vendor in Europe, the Mirai attacks have exceeded 1
TB which is the largest public record, and these attacks were carried out via
small IoT devices such as smart cameras (Cloudflare, 2017). As previously
mentioned, Mirai malware will infect the smart camera and other devices running
on Linux to make them become the botnet to launch DDoS attack. The Mirai
malware’s structure and activity can be divided into 4 steps. The better
understanding how Mirai malware’s the greater against methods could be
provide. The list of the 4 steps, figure 3, are Scan, Report, Enslaved and Control.
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Figure 3. Mirai malware Attack Step (attify, 2019)

Step 1: Scan
The first step for Mirai malware is to continuously scan the publicly
accessible devices without password protect or using the default password and
the IP of IoT devices by sending TCP SYN probe to pseudo-random IPv4
addresses on telnet TCP ports 23 and 2323 through Internet. Once the Mirai
malware discover the attackable device, it will conduct brute-force login by using
the combination of several default password from 62 credentials list which
include most of the default passwords by IoT vendors.
Step 2: Report
Once Mirai malware discovers the devices that is attackable, it will report
the IP and related information of target devices to the command & control (C&C).
When Mirai malware successfully infects the camera, it will camouflage itself by
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using a pseudo-random alphanumeric string as the process name which turns
out it will not exist when the system reboots.
Step 3: Enslaved
After Mirai malware infect the IoT devices, these cameras will become the
bot. The Mirai malware will remove other malware that already exist in the
infected devices to make sure it is safe and make sure that the bots stay in the
botnet securely. All the activities are executed no matter if the user agrees or
disagrees. These bots are waiting for any command from C&C and keep
scanning for other vulnerable devices.
Step 4: Control
The infected cameras could be remotely controlled by C&C and keep
searching for other vulnerable. The hacker could control these bots to launch
DDoS attacks such as HTTP flooding, UDP flooding and TCP flooding to the
target devices decided by C&C. Since most of the smart home devices still do
not have comprehensive network security, it will be easy for Mirai malware to
attack smart cameras and other smart home appliances.
Mirai malware is extremely dangerous as it launches the DDoS attack to
cause lot of damage not only in smart home environment but also business. The
botnet could be spread all over the world, always attacking without user knowing,
which makes Mirai malware more difficult to defend. Figure 4 shows the
geographic distribution of the infected devices by Mirai malware (Brian Krebs,
2017). Another thing that makes Mirai malware tricky is that programmers must
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put a lot of endeavor into detecting a device to make sure whether it is infected or
not, as common symptoms of an infected device such a slow network connection
or lower performance of equipment might not appear.

Figure 4. Geographic Distribution of Infected Devices (Cloudflare, 2017)

Persirai Malware Review
The Persirai Malware, an attack that targets Internet-based smart camera
using UPnP protocol, was discovered by Trend Micro in 2017. Benefiting from
the open-resource code of Mirai malware, hackers are able to change the code
then launch the attack. Targeting over 1,000 Internet Protocol (IP) Camera
models based on various Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) products (Tim
13

Yeh, 2017), the amount of smart camera infected by Persirai malware is two
times more than Mirai malware and over 20% of the infected cameras are in
China (Pierluigi Paganini, 2017). Table 1 shows the amounts of infected cameras
in each country. Based on the vulnerabilities of the smart cameras, Persirai
exploit them so the hackers could access the smart cameras by injecting
commands and connecting them to the server remotely. There are three steps,
as figure 5, for Persirai to infect the smart camera or other IoT devices. The steps
are divided into Scan and Access, Inject and Install, and Control.

Table 1. Infected Smart Cameras in each Country (Trend Micro, 2017)
Country
China
Thailand
United States
Hong Kong
Mexico
United Kingdom
Japan
others

Percentage
20.30%
11.60%
8.84%
4.66%
3.44%
3.40%
3.33%
34.65%
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Figure 5. Progress of Persirai Infection (Trend Micro,2017)

Step 1: Scan and Access
The attackers scan for the vulnerabilities of smart cameras through TCP
port 81. Once targeted the smart camera, Persirai would start to gain access to
management Web interface by using UPnP protocol which is supported by most
of the smart cameras and allow it to remotely control. UPnP protocol allows
devices to open the port on the router so these devices will become the server,
as a highly visible target for malware.
Step 2: Inject and Install
Once Persirai gain the access of the management Web interface, the
attacker can inject the commands to force the smart cameras connect to the Iran
download site for downloading and installing the malicious script which is called
shell. After executing the script, Persirai will drop the installation file to hide it, so
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the user will not even know their devices have already been infected. Also,
Persirai protects the infected smart cameras from other malware. Although
Persirai could be stopped by restarting the smart camera, smart cameras could
still be easily infected again.
Step 3: Control
In this step, the infected smart camera will report to C&C server which is
set at Iran. The C&C server uses these infected cameras as a bot and keeps
scanning through the Internet to search for other vulnerable devices. The
attacker used to exploit a zero-day vulnerability to gain the password from the
user file through these controlled cameras. Also, attackers will start launching the
UDP DDoS attack through SSDP packets which is the core protocol of UPnP.
A large number of these attacks were caused by using the default
password in the device interface (Tim Yeh, Dove Chiu, and Kenney Lu, 2017).
Since Persirai attacks start from scanning through the Internet to gain access to
the vulnerable smart cameras, these default passwords which are public on
Internet enable attackers to take advantage of it. The user should not only
understand what smart devices are connecting to Wi-Fi and change the
password to against Persirai but also stop using UPnP on their server if
necessary so their Internet port would not open through UPnP by the devices in
the interior network without their awareness. The manufacturer also shares the
responsibility against Persirai by providing the latest version of these cameras or

16

IoT devices and always patch the vulnerabilities once they discover them as
soon as possible.

Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) Review
The Cyber Kill Chain (CKC), which was created by Lockheed Martin in
2011, is a cybersecurity model to trace and describe each step of cyber-attack.
The CKC also helps the operator to understand how attackers take advantage of
the vulnerability of IoT devices. The military adopted the concept of “Kill Chain” to
describe the actions used by an adversary to attack and destroy a target (Bianca
Soare, 2022, p.1). Similarity to the concept of military, going through the seven
steps of the CKC benefit the security team to set up the methods or precaution
within each step so the security team can strengthen their incident response,
cyber-defense capability and analysis capability to prevent the continuously
cyber threat. In addition, reversing the attack gives the security team an
opportunity to figure out and analyze new technology to launch the attack from
adversary.
The CKC is composed of seven steps to analyze the cyber-attack and
assist in preparing a defense. The steps of the CKC, figure 6, are
Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command
and Control (C2), and action on Objectives.
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Figure 6. Cyber Kill Chain Steps

Step 1: Reconnaissance
Like traditional war, the first step all the attackers take for the attack is to
search for the potential target and discover the vulnerabilities of the device they
want to attack. The reconnaissance step also involves scanning the existing
interface and new interface of target. During this step, attackers usually use
several tools to collect information. Some kinds of tools might be:
•

Port Scanner: Nmap, Angry IP scanner, TCP port scanner

•

Packet Sniffer: Wireshark, SolarWinds deep packet inspection tool

•

Cloud Service

Step 2: Weaponization
The weaponization happened after attackers gather enough information of
target the generate one or several ways to launch an attack. The weaponization
could be building new malicious software or modifying the existing malware. This
step is still seen as preparation of attack. Once the malicious software is created,
the several ways like Man-in-the-middle attacks, SQL injection attacks, social
engineering or careless employees will be used to invade the target.
18

Step 3: Delivery
The delivery phase can be seen as the start of the attack. After gathering
enough information and gaining access to the target from the previous two steps,
the attacker will connect them to victim to deliver the malicious software. The
most common way for attackers to deliver the malware is through sending
phishing email or sending the link to victims and tempting them to click the link.
Some attackers might conduct social engineering to increase the success rate of
deliver their malicious software. The delivery phase could be the first chance for
defenders to protect their assets by training how to identify the phishing email
and how to deal with social engineering.
Step 4: Exploitation
In exploitation phase, the expected payload from attacker has already
been delivered and the malicious code is working within the target system.
During this step, attackers also take advantage of the vulnerabilities they gain
from step 1. Sometimes the target is not attacked directly by the attacker, but
through exploiting the vulnerabilities of the system or the device the attacker is
able to arrive at their goal to launch the attack. The exploitation step is another
opportunity for defenders to fight against the malicious software that is already
operating within the system. Through proper training, the technical staff should
have several ways to identify the existing malicious software and eliminate it.
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Step 5: Installation
Once the hacker gain access to the target, they will start to install the
malicious software or other application to the system to seek persistence. In
installation step, attackers usually install the backdoor for consistence access so
if there is any future information interested by attackers, the backdoor will enable
them to gain access to the system and leak the information without going through
again the previous steps. The defender can block installed backdoors by
periodically detecting them in logs to check for unusual login time or unusual data
movement.
Step 6: Command and Control (C2)
In C2 phase, hackers are able to communicate to the system through the
malicious software they installed in step 5. Adversary can also control the device
or system remotely to launch the attack. The adversary might do some work to
maintain their control of the target system and keep scanning for the new
interface. It will be too late for defenders to figure out the information is leaking
within this phase because they have already lost control of the system or
devices. However, the defender should cut off the communication between the
adversary and the malicious software and eliminate it once discovered.
Step 7: Action on Objectives
This is the last step in CKC. The intruders already achieved their original
goal. Within this step, various kinds of attack will be launched depending on
adversary and what information they desire to leak. The classification of cyber-
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attack might be Malware Attack, SQL Injection Attack, Man-in-the-middle attacks,
Denial-of-Service Attack, and Cryptojacking.
The CKC is an analysis tool that can divide the attack into several parts
and enable the defender to look at the detail in each step so the defender or the
security team can have a greater understand to the attack then set up a proper
mitigation plan to control the attack until eliminate it. Also, defender must
remember that the time is the most essential thing to defect the malicious
software while conducting CKC steps because the adversary will continue
establishing the best way to infect the target until the defender identify it then
eliminate it. By conducting CKC when the attack occurrs, the defender will figure
out the mitigating control within each step and then know where the control
should be implemented to break the chain.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY

Project Purpose
The purpose of this project to analyze Mirai malware and Persirai malware
among all distinct kinds of malware is even though the creator of Mirai malware
has already been caught and the Persirai creator is still unknown, attackers are
still able to take advantage of both malware’s open-source code to create their
own variant malware to attack smart camera or other IoT devices. Defending
against both Mirai and Persirai malware is a huge challenge because people
never know when the attack will be launched, and the impact range can narrow
down to a smart home environment and zoom to the large company. Both are
targets of attackers. Although there are already some methods to protect against
malwares, the point of this project is not to evaluate or examine the efficacy. The
main purpose of this project is to go through the steps of how these two
malwares infect smart cameras and try to provide methods against them then
see which the best way is to defend.

Procedure
The process of knowing how Mirai malware and Persirai malware take
advantage to vulnerabilities of smart cameras in smart home environment will be
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done by going through the steps both malwares infect smart cameras. By
following the malware’s attack step-by-step, the goal is to analyze the steps of
the attack and try to figure out the methods to against the attack in each step.
Once figured out the method that can be used to patch vulnerabilities of smart
cameras, it will be analyzed and resulted in data to see if it is available to prevent
the malware attack.
The Malware
The two malwares will be analyzed separately. The four steps of the Mirai
malware attack will be simulated then the three steps of Persirai malware attack
will be imitated. This project will put efforts to run these two malwares by going
through each step as making them look like the real-world attack.
The Environment: Wi-Fi
Since most of the smart cameras are operating wireless, wireless network
security is becoming a critical issue in business and home. Smart cameras
connect and communicate through Wi-Fi still have the risk. Although the wireless
network has an internet access security system such as firewall to block people
who desire to access without signing up, the attackers could still scan the
network and take advantage of the leaking data by infecting the devices connect
to Wi-Fi. To prevent the leaking data, Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was
created in 1997 by using 10 or 26 hexadecimal digits for its key recognize as a
part of 802.11 standard. The only goal for WEP is to protect the data stolen from
hackers. WEP used to be widely used and was the top choice for users.
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However, WEP was not as effective as people expect when facing
massive cyber-attacks, so people end up using Wi-Fi Access (WPA) to replace
WEP. WPA solved the security defect WEP had and was encrypted using a preshared key and Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). So far, people are using
WPA2 as an upgraded version of WPA by using advanced encryption standard
(AES) which the U.S government approves. It is expected to protect the family
network by applying on most the devices and Wi-fi routers to encrypt the Wi-fi
flow. However, the interface of WPA2 is still at considerable risk of attack which
is also a problem from WPA. The lack of methods to prevent leaking data
provides the ideal environment for hackers to scan through Wi-Fi for vulnerable
devices.

The Simulation Process
By going through the simulation process of malware attack, we should
figure out some vulnerabilities of smart cameras and then find some methods to
prevent so we can answer the question posed in problem statement. The three
steps are scan through the network, report, and control and launch attack.
Step 1: Scan Through the Network
This step will scan through the Network to look for the IP of the smart
cameras and the vulnerable cameras connecting to the Internet through ports 23
and 81 to simulate how Mirai malware and Persirai malware really do in the real
world. Once figure out the location of the cameras, this project will supply the lists
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of the usually used default password for both malware to login to the smart
camera and then go to the next step.
Step 2: Report
After gaining access to smart cameras, this step will supply some code or
data to show how these malware uses infected cameras for reporting to C&C and
what they will execute to download the script to the infected cameras. Also, this
step tries to look at how both malwares prevent the infected cameras from other
malware.
Step 3: Control and Launch Attack
In this step we will look at what command will be provided by C&C and
provide the data of how the infected smart cameras launch DDoS attacks such
as HTTP flooding, UDP flooding and TCP flooding. It should provide details of
the data needed to figure out the ways to protect against malware.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DATA COLLECTION AND MALWARE ANALYSIS

This chapter will go through the simulation process. Also, the simulation
process is just trying to simulate the attack as much as possible and see what
can be found. No devices will be infected by DDoS attack and no damage will be
caused through the process based on the legal and ethical considerations.

Mirai Malware Analysis
The Mirai malware simulation analysis is a three steps process based on
the simulation step provide in chapter 3. The three steps of the simulation are
scan the network, report, and control and launch the attack.
•

Tools: Angry IP scanner, Nmap

•

OS system: Microsoft Windows

•

IP address: 192.168.4.104

•

Scanning network range: 192.168.4.0/24

Step 1: Scan the Network
The first step hackers will take is to scan the network to see if there’s any
open port so they can look for the attackable smart camera or the devices which
are not protected by strong password. Normally, Mirai malware scan through the
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Internet but not only the specific Local Area Network (LAN). In this simulation,
however, the scanning network range is narrowed down to 192.168.4.1~
192.168.4.255 based on typing “ipconfig” in command prompt in Microsoft
Windows. Showing by figure 7, the device which is used to scan the network is
connecting to the Wireless LAN.

Figure 7. IPconfig Command

Nmap will be implemented in this step. Nmap is a free network security
scanner used in this step for network discovery and scanning for the open port.
After determining the range of network, type “nmap -open 192.168.4.0/24” in the
command line to show all the open ports on this network. See figure 8.
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Figure 8. Open Ports on Network

As Mirai malware do which is mentioned in chapter 2, the telnet TCP ports
23 and 2323 is scanned through Internet by typing “nmap -p23 192.168.4.0/24”
and “nmap -p2323 192.168.4.0/24”. See figure 9 and figure 10. It shows the port
state, the MAC address and the name of the devices connecting to the network.
Table 2 shows the meaning of the state.
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Figure 9. Port 23

Figure 10. Port 2323
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Table 2. State of the Ports
State
Open

Description
The port responds to TCP/UDP
requests

Closed

There is no listening service for
connection

Filtered

Nmap cannot detect whether the port
is open or closed due to the firewall
blocking the port.

Another network scanner is Angry IP scanner. Like Nmap, after typing IP
range then click “start”, Angry IP scanner shows the IP address, ping, host name
and port in the define range. See figure 11.

Figure 11. Angry IP Scanner

30

Once Mirai malware discovers the attackable smart camera or other
devices by scanning the network, it will start attempting to gain the access.
According to the Imperva Incapsula security team, Mirai malware executes bruteforce login to guess the password of discovered smart cameras (Ben, Igal, Dima,
2016). Table 3 is the combination of username and password the attacker might
use to conduct brute force login. After gaining access to smart cameras, the
infected smart camera will go to the next step.

Table 3. List of Password Combination
Username

Password

Root

Admin

Root

Default

Root

12345678

User

Admin1234

admin

Password

admin

88888888

Step 2: Report
After successfully access to smart cameras, Mirai malware send the detail
of smart cameras to C&C so the attacker can select the victim IP address and
the attack time. C&C is a control center of infected smart cameras which controls
the devices to launch DDoS attack and keep receiving the details from the new
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infected devices. Mirai malware will delete the existed services running on the
infected smart cameras and install the script so the infected cameras will not be
infected again by other malware such as worms and Trojans. Figure 12 shows a
part of open-source code from Sourcegraph to kill the process running on the
port 23.

Figure 12. Kill Process Code (Sourcegraph, 2016)

Step 3: Control and Launch Attack
In this step, the infected smart cameras are called bots. These bots are
waiting for the commands from C&C to launch the DDoS attack such as HTTP
flooding, TCP/UDP flooding and other attacks on OSI application layer. These
botnets are not just waiting for commands to launch but keeping scanning the
Network as step 1 do then go step 2 to keep looping until Mirai malware is
eliminated from smart cameras.
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Persirai Malware Analysis
Step 1: Scan the Network
Same as the simulation process Mirai malware went, Persirai malware
scan through the Internet and scan for the vulnerable smart cameras through
TCP port 81. In this step, the scanning network range is still limited at
192.168.4.1~ 192.168.4.255, see figure 6 Ipconfig Command. Since hackers
usually use Persirai malware to attack smart cameras and other IoT devices by
UPnP which uses UDP 1900 and all used TCP, we scan the open port, please
see figure 8 above, TCP port 81 and UDP 1900 by using the command from
Nmap.
The telnet TCP ports 81 and UDP 1900 are scanned through the Internet
by typing “nmap -p81 192.168.4.0/24” and “nmap -p U:1900 192.168.4.0/24”.
See figure 13 and figure 14. The UDP 1900 scanning, see figure 13, shows the
MAC address and the name of the devices connecting to the network as TCP
port scanning, the only difference is that it does not show the port state.
However, in UDP scanning, the port will be seen as open if the device responds
to the request.
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Figure 13. Port 81

Figure 14. UDP 1900
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After scanning for vulnerable smart cameras, Persirai would start gaining
access to management Web interface. To gain access to management Web
interface, the first need is to get the router’s IP address. The IP address can be
known by typing ipconfig in command line as figure 6 shows. Once access the
management Web interface, see figure 15, the attacker will start applying the
password combination, like table 3, to login the web management then go to next
step.

Figure 15. Management Web Interface

Step 2: Report
In this step, the Persirai has already logged in to the vulnerable smart
camera web management. Persirai executes the code, figure 16, to script
download site and waits for the respond. Once the infected smart cameras
receive the response, the shell script, will be installed and conducted. The shell
script will be deleted and hidden after installed. Like Mirai malware, Persirai also
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report the details of infected smart cameras to C&C and prevent the infected
smart cameras from attacking by other malware.

Figure 16. Script Download Request and Respond (Trend Micro, 2017)

Step 3: Control and Launch Attack
During this step, the infected smart cameras are also called bots. These
bots are waiting for the commands from C&C to launch the UDP flooding DDoS
attack. Due to most of smart cameras are conducting UPnP, these bots could
easily discover the port of the router opened by these smart cameras, so these
bots are able to scan and attack other vulnerable smart cameras through
Network as step 1 do then go step 2 until Persirai malware is eliminated from
smart cameras just like Mirai malware do. Figure 17 shows part of UDP flooding
code from SourceGraph.

36

Figure 17. UDP Flooding (SourceGraph, 2017)

Combine Malware With CKC
By going through the simulation process of Mirai malware and Persirai
malware, we can know how they work and combine the CKC to prevent the
attack since the primary goal of both malwares is trying to enter the smart
camera and to gain the access. The CKC gives seven steps as a framework to
analyze and lower the risk of smart cameras suffering from malware attack.
When looking at the Mirai malware and Persirai malware, we understand that the
final goal of both malwares is to infect smart cameras then use them as bots to
launch the attack. By figuring out the steps provided by CKC, we could identify
some methods in each step to mitigate and prevent malware. Since the Mirai
malware and Persirai malware are operating equivalent to infect, the mitigation
methods could be used similarly. The seven steps of CKC could be divided into
three parts. Phase 1 (Reconnaissance) through phase 4 (Exploitation) is the first
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part which could be seen as scan the Network step in simulation process. Phase
5 (Installation) and phase 6 (C2) are the second part which is the report part in
simulation process. Phase 7 (Actions on objectives) is the third part as control
and launch the attack. The ways that can be provided to protect smart cameras
from Mirai malware and Persirai malware will be focused on the first and second
part.
In the first part, attackers scan through the network to see if there is any
open port so they can gain access to smart cameras or other devices through
these open ports. For normal smart cameras users to prevent Mirai malware and
Persirai malware is to remember to check their network by using scanning tools
to see what smart cameras or other devices are connecting to the network then
see if there is any open port. Once the open port is figured out, the user should
close it as soon as possible to lower the risk. Sometimes attackers might send
phishing emails to victims with a link, when people click the link, the malicious
malware will have the opportunity to invade the network to infect smart cameras.
Not only the general user may be affected by phishing email, but companies also
receive it. Without proper training, careless employees can be vulnerable to
social engineering attack so attackers can deliver malware. Passwords are also
an essential part of defending against malware, and once the smart camera or
other device is installed, users should change their password but do not continue
to use the default password. The structure of a strong password should be:
•

Different from any previous passwords
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•

At least 12 characters long

•

Include characters from at least 3 of the following 4 categories:
o uppercase
o lowercase
o numbers
o symbols

•

Not be a single, recognizable word or your username. Passphrases
are preferred

If users have been trained before or have related knowledge, they can still
identify malware on their infected smart cameras and then eliminate it. However,
most users are not trained enough to identify and eliminate by themselves. One
of the ways is to cooperate with an outsourcing company to monitor their smart
cameras so the malware could be identified by the outsourcing company and
then eliminate it. Another way for general users is to be aware of their smart
cameras, most of the smart cameras have a light on when it’s operating and
there is a microphone in it so users can speak through smart cameras. When
people see the unusually flickering lights, the light is on when the user is not
using it or there is a strange noise from smart cameras while not using, they
should realize that their smart cameras might already be infected.
Within the second part, step 5 (Installation) and step 6 (C2) in CKC,
attackers install the backdoor on the victim system so they can access their
target camera anytime they want without going through previous CKC steps. The
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only thing users and defenders need to do are to block the installation and sever
the link between command and control. Once the attacker cannot send the
command, the infected smart cameras will be no action which means that the
defender successfully prevents the impact. The way to block the installation is to
implement a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) to examine every
individual host and every event that occurs in a host for suspicious activities so
that it can block common installation paths. The user should also audit the log of
smart cameras regularly to identify if there is any suspicious file created.
Anti-Virus (AV) is another tool users and defenders should implement to
their smart cameras or other IoT devices to provide real-time protection against
malicious software, spyware, and phishing. The AV can cooperate with HIPS to
protect smart cameras in a safer way. AV is available on the windows operating
system or from third parties with lower cost.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Summary of Analysis
The analysis of Mirai malware and Persirai malware produced related
results when applied to a simulation process in the small simple network and
then combine with both malware to CKC. The network and malware were a
constant part of the analysis when applied CKC. The simulation process provided
for both malware showed that the focus of risk mitigation is the same concept for
any smart camera user. The key similarity between the two malware simulations
was scanning for the open port which is always ignored by the user. The open
port is the break where both malwares can identify the target then try to gain
access. Another key similarity between the two malware simulations was the
password. Mirai malware applied brute force login to target smart cameras while
Persirai used web management to login to the system and gain access. Both
similarities show that the user is the most essential part in defending against
malware. Attackers might use phishing techniques, malicious files, and social
engineering to gain the user password or locate them in the target network. All
malicious techniques are a major threat to a careless user. Common mitigation
controls to protect smart cameras cannot be separated from the user, as they
facilitate malware deployment within smart cameras.
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What Vulnerabilities Might the Smart Camera Have?
While going through the simulation process, we know that the major
vulnerabilities of smart cameras might have been the open ports and using
default passwords or weak passwords themselves or on web management.
While operating smart cameras, users must ensure all the ports are closed.
Regularly scan through the network to check for the ports then check the log to
see if there are any suspicious activities or download. Also, the name of the
devices connected to the network helps hackers to identify their target. The other
vulnerabilities are users, the lack of security knowledge could lead users to click
on phishing emails and then cause their smart cameras to be infected. Another
vulnerability for users is the lack of auditing. When malware reports to C&C and
uses bots to launch an attack, there will be a record. Once users do not examine
the log periodically for unusual activities, it would be the reason for attackers to
use smart cameras as bots to launch attack such as MitM and DDoS.
How Mirai Malware and Persirai Malware Take Advantage to These
Vulnerabilities and How Can They Be Prevented?
Mirai malware and Persirai malware take advantage of open port and
weak or default password to gain access to the smart cameras. Besides,
attackers launch MitM attacks to gather information and they use the infected
smart cameras as bots to launch DDoS attacks. Attackers also use a phishing
email to allure victims click the link to help spread malware. The ways to prevent
Mirai malware and Persirai could be found by understanding how they work and
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then combining with CKC. A strong password should be set and need to change
every 6 months. In addition, the user should implement some mitigation software
such as AV, HIPS and Patch. Users need to be aware of phishing emails since
most of the malware is sent via email with a link. By not clicking the link in the
email protect smart cameras, even the private network. Users could also find an
outsourcing company to help them monitor their cameras. Be aware of the
unusual sound or lights on smart cameras. Once figure out the infected cameras,
cut the communication between cameras to the network to prevent a backdoor
used by attackers to look through another target connect to the network.

Conclusion
This project made the analysis of two malware that usually attack smart
cameras and built the simulation to see how attackers do in the real world to gain
access to smart cameras and launch attacks. Then combine the simulation steps
with CKC steps to figure out what methods can be applied to prevent or mitigate
the malware attack. Although there is no best way to guarantee that it could
100% prevent smart cameras from infecting by Mirai malware and Persirai
malware, what was learned is that several mitigation methods can be combined
to improve the security of smart cameras and the user is an important part to
defend malware. In conclusion, the more security knowledge the smart camera
user has, the safer the smart cameras will be.
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Future Work
Apart from Mirai malware and Persirai malware, malware attack is
ubiquitous. The open-source code of these malware is still a threat to people
because everyone can get it through the Network, and nobody knows when and
where the new variant of malware will emerge. For future work, we still need to
look at more variables and solutions to malware attacks since an increase in
people is using smart cameras not only in their homes but in their companies.
There is more knowledge to learn and more work to do for users to improve their
cyber defense state.
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